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Introduction.  
 To say that “corruption” is an enemy to progress and development would strike many as 
tautology.  But despite the obvious danger that corruption poses to a well-functioning society, in the 
United States and (more so) abroad, the law has only recently shifted toward regulating conduct that 
may be deemed corrupt where it occurs at the hands of domestic actors operating abroad.  Indeed, 
until recently sums paid as foreign bribes were valid tax deductions in many countries.1  In 1977, 
however, the United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and thereby set what 
                                                 
1 Sharon Eicher, Introduction: What Corruption is and Why it Matters, in CORRUPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL AND LEGAL DIVERSITY 1, 2 (Sharon 
Eicher ed., 2009).  
 2 
has become a global standard for regulating corrupt activities.  Or at least what the United States 
deems “corrupt.” 
 Much of the difficulty that corruption presents from a regulatory standpoint is that activities 
that are considered improper in certain parts of the world would not be thought of as such in other 
regions.  Indeed, commentators note that we should not analyze corruption in absolute moral terms; 
instead, we must address problems with the improper use of power in light of surrounding social, 
economic, and political contexts.2  Practically speaking, what is a gift in one society may be a bribe in 
another. What may be corporate lobbying in one polity may be an unfair purchase of political power 
in another.  And what may be the cost of doing business in one economy may be a systemic flaw in 
another.   
 In the face of these nuances, however, the United States government has vigorously enforced 
the FCPA across the world, bringing within its grasp activities that may carry only a tangential link to 
the states.  With this in mind, whether the current approach to FCPA enforcement is a valid regulatory 
effort or, alternatively, an act of legal imperialism becomes an inevitable question.  In this Note, I will 
explore these notions through a practical lens, arguing that U.S. courts, when given the opportunity 
to oversee an FCPA prosecution, should place limitations on its extraterritorial reach in light of the 
interests of foreign jurisdictions, business, and foreign relations.  In Part I, I provide a brief history of 
the FCPA, including how it developed in Congress as well as how the government has interpreted the 
Act.  In Part II, I propose a framework as to how courts should analyze personal jurisdiction in FCPA 
cases.  In Part III, I discuss how courts should analyze prescriptive jurisdiction under the FCPA and 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., John Gledhill, Corruption as the Mirror of the State in Latin America, in BETWEEN MORALITY 
AND THE LAW 155, 156 (Italo Pardo ed., 2004) ( “[C]orruption must not be analysed in a moralizing 
framework but must be seen as a mode of exercizing power within complex social and political 
settings that must be analysed carefully and in their historical and cultural specificity.”).  
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the interests courts should consider when (and if) they are deciding whether to limit the extraterritorial 
reach of the FCPA.  
I. Historical Development of the FCPA’s Reach 
a. Statutory Development 
The FCPA regulates two illicit corporate activities: bribery and false or inaccurate accounting.3  
The FCPA’s antibribery provisions proscribe payments that are made with “corrupt intent” to obtain 
or retain business and are made to “foreign officials” operating in their “official capacity.”4  These 
provisions include three jurisdictional hooks, which make them applicable to “domestic concerns” 
(U.S. persons and businesses), U.S. “issuers” (U.S. and foreign public companies listed on stock 
exchanges in the United States or that are required to file periodic reports with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission), and, under the FCPA’s “territorial jurisdiction,”  foreign individuals and 
businesses committing certain acts within U.S. territories. 5   The accounting provisions require 
maintenance of accurate books and records, as well as systems of internal accounting controls; they 
also prohibit knowingly falsifying books and records or failing to maintain internal control systems.6  
The accounting provisions, however, have a much narrower jurisdictional reach than the antibribery 
regulations, applying only to U.S. issuers.7    
Despite the broad jurisdictional reach that the FCPA’s antibribery provisions now contain—
allowing U.S. prosecution of almost entirely foreign conduct—Congress originally enacted the 
                                                 
3 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012); id. § 78m.  
4 Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3; CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE 
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 2 (2012), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa [hereinafter DOJ & SEC GUIDE].  These 
provisions do not apply to “so-called grease or facilitating payments,” H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 
(1977); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (exception for routine governmental action), and they include 
two affirmative defenses for payments that are legal under the law of the foreign official’s country or 
otherwise “reasonable and bona fide.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c).  
5 DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 10–11.  
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m.  
7 See id.  
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antibribery provisions in 19778 in response to foreign mistrust of American corporations.  This mistrust 
was due in no small part to the Watergate scandal, which lead to public scrutiny of American 
corruption.9  In assessing the merits of the FCPA, the Senate reported that the SEC discovered over 
400 U.S. corporations responsible for corrupt foreign payments, implicating hundreds of millions of 
U.S. dollars.10  In light of this, “[f]oreign governments friendly to the United States . . . ha[d] come 
under intense pressure from their own people,” and “[t]he image of American democracy abroad ha[d] 
been tarnished.”11  Congress thus felt obligated to rein in American corporate corruption overseas out 
of self-interest, especially because of “the fact that [although] the payments which [the Act] would 
prohibit are made to foreign officials, in many cases the resulting adverse competitive affects [sic] are 
entirely domestic.”12   
The FCPA was thus enacted out of a fundamentally domestic concern, but that soon changed.  
Before 1998, the FCPA reflected Congress’s desire to regulate American businesses’ conduct overseas: 
the Act only bestowed jurisdiction over U.S. issuers and domestic concerns; it did not include a 
territorial jurisdictional hook and therefore did not bestow jurisdiction to prosecute foreign actors 
making foreign bribes that took place in part—if even tangentially—in the United States.13  Congress 
quickly realized, however, that under this scheme, the FCPA placed American businesses at a 
disadvantage in the international marketplace, where foreign businesses and individuals were not only 
able to bribe foreign officials in furtherance of business efforts but might even be able to reap tax 
deductions for such expenditures.14  Consequently, the United States sought to impose its definition 
                                                 
8 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494.  
9 See S. REP. NO. 105-277 (1998); Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally 
Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 689, 694 (2000).  
10 See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (emphasis added).  
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
12 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (emphasis added).  
13 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107.  
14 See H.R. REP. NO. 105–802, at 10 (1998).  
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of “corruption” on international markets in order to “level the playing field,”15 thereby going beyond 
the initial trust-instilling impetus behind the FCPA. 
Against this backdrop, in 1988 Congress commanded the Executive Branch to negotiate with 
the United States’ prominent trading partners in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to pass legislation similar to the FCPA.16  Pursuant to these negotiations, in 
1997 the United States and thirty-three other countries entered into the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention).17  The OECD Convention requires signatory countries to criminalize the bribery of 
foreign public officials by “any person” and “to establish . . . jurisdiction . . . when the offence is 
committed in whole or in part in its territory.”18  The OECD Convention also required signatories to 
pass legislation with a geographically broad reach; indeed, OECD commentary provided that “[t]he 
territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection 
to the bribery act is not required.”19 
Pursuant to the OECD Convention, in 1998 Congress amended the FCPA to bestow 
territorial jurisdiction over “any person other than an issuer . . . or a domestic concern . . . or for any 
officer, director, employee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of 
such person, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of” a prohibited payment.”20  
Since the 1998 amendment, the DOJ and SEC have followed the OECD Commentary and have 
                                                 
15 Id. at 9.  
16 STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS 276–77 (2010).  
17 Id.  
18 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, arts. 1, 4, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.  
19 OECD, THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 16 (2011). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–3(a) (2012) (amended 1998) (emphasis added).  
 6 
prosecuted foreign actors under the authority of this jurisdictional hook, perhaps beyond the OECD’s 
intentions. 
 
b. Prosecutorial Development 
As FCPA enforcement has become more vigorous, the U.S. government continues to push 
the bounds of the FCPA’s reach.  Indeed, even if in furtherance of a wholly foreign payment between 
wholly foreign parties, so much as “placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, text message, or fax 
from, to, or through the United States” or “sending a wire transfer from or to a U.S. bank or otherwise 
using the U.S. banking system, or traveling across state borders or internationally to or from the United 
States” suffices to bring that conduct within the FCPA’s scope, at least in the government’s view.21   
The DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement practices have operated substantially without judicial 
oversight,22 thereby leaving the contours of territorial jurisdiction under the FCPA largely undefined.  
The prosecutorial freedom that the government enjoys in this realm is due not only to the weighty 
criminal sanctions that the FCPA carries, which incentivize targets of FCPA investigations to enter 
into nonprosecution agreements or plea bargains, but also to lessened punishments for cooperative 
individuals or corporations that self-report or assist with government investigations.23  Consequently, 
government prosecutors have almost unilaterally defined the scope of the FCPA’s territorial 
jurisdiction.   
                                                 
21 DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 11. 
22 See DEMING,  supra note 16, at 4 (“Any analysis of the FCPA must begin with the understanding 
that its provisions have rarely been subject to judicial scrutiny.”); Sean Hecker & Margot Laporte, 
Should FCPA “Territorial” Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial Proportions?, 42 INT’L L. NEWS,  (Winter 
2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/international_law_news/2013/winter/should_fcpa_terri
torial_jurisdiction_reach_extraterritorial_proportions.html (“Entities, often under intense pressure 
to settle and get FCPA charges behind them, rarely challenge this aggressive jurisdictional 
position.”).  
23 See Heather Diefenbach, FCPA Enforcement Against Foreign Companies: Does America Know Best?, 2 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. ONLINE 47, 49 (2014).  
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Given the apathy that an FCPA defendant may have toward a jurisdictional challenge (and not 
to mention that plea agreements in criminal cases brought by the DOJ require court approval and thus 
jurisdiction24), settlements with the government have effectively defined the bounds of the FCPA’s 
territorial jurisdiction.  These settlements reveal a drastically broad reach.  Take United States v. JGC 
Corp.,25 for example.  In that case, the Japanese defendant, JGC Corporation (JGC), which is not a U.S. 
issuer nor a domestic concern for FCPA purposes, faced DOJ allegations of bribing Nigerian officials 
to obtain government contracts; the only jurisdictional ties to the United States were that JGC had 
conspired with an American joint-venture partner, and that wire transfers—originating in and arriving 
at wholly foreign bank accounts—passed through New York bank accounts.26  Despite this near de 
minimis link to the United States, upon court approval, JGC entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement, thereby admitting guilt to the allegations and requiring it to pay a $218 million fine to the 
U.S. government, implement a comprehensive antibribery compliance program, and engage a 
corporate compliance consultant.27 
The following parts will endeavor to wrestle with the jurisdictional limitations that U.S. courts 
should impose on FCPA prosecutions.  I will argue that courts should engage in rigorous analyses of 
both personal jurisdiction over particular FCPA defendants as well as prescriptive jurisdiction over 
foreign conduct.  Generally, the slimmer the nexus between the United States and the defendant or 
conduct at issue, the less reason the U.S. government has to apply the FCPA.  
II. Personal Jurisdiction Over FCPA Defendants 
                                                 
24 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
25 No. 4:11-cr-00260, 2011 WL 1315939 (S.D. Tex.) (Deferred Prosecution Agreement).  
26 See Information at 10, 13, 18–19, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-00260 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 
2011); Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under International Law, 51 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225, 245 (2015).   
27 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7–11, JGC Corp., (S.D. Tex.) (No. 4:11-cr-00260).  
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In order for a U.S. court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in an FCPA 
prosecution, due process requires that the defendant have some nexus with the United States such 
that the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the states and that the exercise of jurisdiction over 
the defendant is “reasonable.”28  Although few courts have considered the issue, several have upheld 
the government’s exorbitant29 assertion of jurisdiction as not violating due process; but others have 
limited the FCPA’s reach, particularly where the government asserts that a nonissuer, nondomestic 
concern is amenable to prosecution in the United States because it acted in furtherance of a bribe in 
U.S. territory.  For example, in United States v. Patel, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed FCPA charges against a defendant who was a U.K. citizen and director of a nonissuer U.K. 
corporation.30  The government argued that the court had jurisdiction because the defendant allegedly 
mailed an agreement related to the bribe from the United Kingdom to the states; the court rejected 
this argument, however, holding that “each act” in furtherance of the bribe must take place within 
U.S. territory to satisfy the FCPA’s jurisdictional hook.31  Thus, although the defendant’s conduct may 
                                                 
28 Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).  “Section 27 of the [Securities and] 
Exchange Act, specifically 15 U.S.C. Section 78aa, governs the exercise of personal jurisdiction in 
securities cases” and “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limit of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”  SEC v. Sharef, 924 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).  
29 For a definition of “exorbitant jurisdiction,” see Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, 
Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV. 474, 476 (2006) (“[W]e might define exorbitant jurisdiction as 
jurisdiction exercised validly under a country’s rules that nevertheless appears unreasonable because 
of the grounds necessarily used to justify jurisdiction.  But we can probably go farther than this 
subjective test and identify an objective standard on which accusations of exorbitance tend to rely.  
That standard seems to focus on whether a class of jurisdiction, as opposed to a single assertion of 
jurisdiction, is unfair to the defendant because of a lack of significant connection between the 
sovereign and either the parties or the dispute.” (citations omitted)).  
30 See Leibold, supra note 26, at 246–47 (citing, inter alia, Indictment at 9, United States v. Patel, No. 
09-338 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2009), Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 1, United States v. Goncalves, 
cr-003350RJL4 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2012)); Hecker & Laporte, supra note 22 (citing Trial Transcript at 
5:11–14, 7:17–8:2, United States v. Patel, No. 1:09-cr-00335 (D.D.C. June 6, 2011)).  
31 Leibold, supra note 26, at 246 n.110 (quoting FCPA Summer Review 2011, Miller Chevalier (July 13, 
2011), http://www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/MillerChevalierPublications?find=60408)).   
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have been physically directed toward the United States, it was not directed toward impacting U.S. markets in 
the sense that the FCPA should condemn.   
Even without a robust analysis, the outcome in Patel is intuitively compelling; but two 2013 
cases out of the Southern District of New York crystallize the limitations that due process places on 
the exercise of jurisdiction in the context of the FCPA.  In SEC v. Straub, Judge Richard Sullivan 
upheld jurisdiction in an FCPA case against executives of a Hungarian telecommunications company 
who allegedly bribed Macedonian public officials through a Greek intermediary.32  Although the 
parties involved were wholly foreign actors, the telecommunication company was listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, so even if the defendants’ alleged conduct was not “principally directed” at the 
United States, the conduct was still “designed to violate United States securities regulations.”33   
Conversely, in SEC. v. Sharef, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin dismissed an FCPA case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Herbert Steffen, a seventy-four year old former executive of 
a German manufacturing company’s Argentine subsidiary.34  The government alleged that Steffen had 
encouraged another executive to authorize bribes to Argentinian officials, which in turn had resulted 
in falsified SEC filings to conceal the scheme.35  The court held, however, that Steffen’s contacts with 
the United States were “far too attenuated” to satisfy due process, and even if they were sufficient, 
haling Steffen into a U.S. court and requiring him to defend would have been “unreasonable” given 
his “lack of geographic ties to the United States, his age, his poor proficiency in English, and the 
forum’s diminished interest in adjudicating the matter.”36  The court distinguished this case from 
Straub, reasoning that the allegations in that case involved the defendants personally signing off on 
                                                 
32 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
33 Id. 
34 924 F. Supp. 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
35 Id. at 542, 546.  
36 Id. at 546–48. 
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false SEC filings; Steffen, on the other hand, “neither authorized the bribe, nor directed the cover up, 
much less played any role in the falsified filings.”37   
Thus, in bestowing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants alleged to have violated the 
FCPA by bribing foreign officials, the dividing line between Patel and Sharef on the one hand, and 
Straub on the other,  is where the alleged violation is directed toward impacting U.S. securities markets such 
that it would undermine reliance on those markets, thus creating the requisite minimum contacts 
between the defendant and the United States.  To be sure, accepting the government’s allegations in 
Sharef as true and assuming that Steffen had encouraged another executive to bribe an Argentinian 
official would in itself not establish conduct directed towards impacting U.S. securities markets; it 
would remain wholly foreign conduct.  But, as the analysis in Sharef implies, once falsified SEC filings 
enter the picture (which in Sharef were not at the hands of Steffen), the United States would have a 
valid jurisdictional basis to proceed against the party responsible for the falsified filings.38  And so that 
we don’t miss the forest for the trees, we must keep in mind that this dividing line is consistent with 
the original rationale behind the FCPA: providing assurance in domestic markets and preventing domestic 
adverse effects.39   
If the due process limits over FCPA defendants depend on whether a violation is directed 
toward impacting U.S. markets, which in my view it should be, this would render unconstitutional 
many, if not most, FCPA prosecutions brought pursuant to the government’s expansive reading of 
the FCPA’s jurisdictional scope.  For example, under this principle, the prosecution of the nonissuer, 
                                                 
37 Id. at 547.  
38 See id. (“To be sure, there is ample (and growing) support in case law for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over individuals who played a role in falsifying or manipulating financial statements 
relied upon by U.S. investors in order to cover up illegal actions directed entirely at a foreign 
jurisdiction.” (citing SEC v. Stanard, No Civ. 7736 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007) (unpublished transcript 
of ruling, Opp. Ex. 1, Tr. 3: 15–18); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005); In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).  
39 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.   
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nondomestic concern in United States v. JGC Corp. would be beyond the limits of due process because 
the alleged bribery there was between a Japanese corporation and Nigerian public officials40 and 
therefore did not pose the risk of any direct impact on U.S. markets.  Opponents to this approach 
could argue that this would eviscerate the 1998 amendments to the FCPA and undermine the rationale 
behind those amendments.  For instance, they would argue, the 1998 amendments were purported to 
“even the playing field” in foreign jurisdictions that are loath to pursue bribery prosecutions, and in a 
case such as JGC Corp., a U.S. firm could have acquired the highly valuable government contract41 if 
not for the advantage that lax foreign bribery prosecution would provide to foreign firms.  This 
argument, however, boils down to the ends justifying the means; and for the sake of legitimacy and 
foreign relations, U.S. courts must not countenance such Machiavellian reasoning, especially where 
the “means” are unilaterally imposing criminal sanctions on foreign actors by unduly stretching the 
bounds of the Constitution, and the “ends” are easing U.S. firms’ ability to compete in foreign markets.  
Indeed, foreign businesses and governments could interpret this exercise of sovereign power abroad 
as an act of legal imperialism that could cripple any improvements to foreign perceptions of U.S. 
corporate, political, and jurisprudential culture resulting from the 1977 enactment of the FCPA.  
The foregoing analysis has considered how U.S. courts should grapple with personal 
jurisdiction in FCPA cases involving predominately foreign parties and foreign conduct.  As we’ve 
seen, this issue implicates notions of foreign relations, sovereign powers, and, ultimately, the role of 
the United States as a regulator of foreign corruption.  But the courts can only do so much in this 
arena; in the next Part, I will address the more profound issue of prescriptive jurisdiction, which asks 
                                                 
40 JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million 
Criminal Penalty, DEP’T JUST., OFF. PUB. AFF. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jgc-
corporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-2188.   
41 The contracts at issue in the case were valued at over $6 billion.  Id. 
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the question whether the United States as a sovereign may legitimately regulate foreign conduct as it 
has under the FCPA.  
III. Prescriptive Jurisdiction Over Foreign Bribery 
a. International Law’s Traditional Approach to Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
Whereas personal jurisdiction seeks to answer whether a particular court may assert authority 
over a particular defendant, prescriptive jurisdiction seeks to answer whether a particular sovereign 
may validly apply its law to a given set of facts.42  International law recognizes five traditional bases 
for a sovereign to assert jurisdiction to prescribe law: 1) “territorial” jurisdiction over conduct 
occurring wholly or substantially within the sovereign’s territory; 2) “nationality” jurisdiction over the 
conduct of the sovereign’s nationals, whether or not such conduct occurs within its territory; 3) 
“passive personal” jurisdiction over foreign conduct by non-nationals that is directed against the 
sovereign; 4) “protective” jurisdiction over conduct that may injure national interests; and 5) “universal” 
jurisdiction over conduct that is considered so heinous that any jurisdiction would condemn it.43  
Beyond this, the sovereign’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction must also be “reasonable,” a standard 
upon which the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403 imposes the following factors “where 
appropriate”:  
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which 
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the 
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, 
or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the 
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree 
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation;  
                                                 
42 See Anthony J. Colangelo, Essay, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 
1304–05, 1329–32 (2014).  
43 See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899–900 (D.D.C. 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).  
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(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic 
system;  
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the 
international system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and  
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.44 
 
Historically, U.S. courts have limited the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes if not doing so 
would be “unreasonable”; although the case law on this point may not have spoken in the language 
of section 403 per se, it aimed at the same concern: comity, or a decision to defer to another 
jurisdiction if that jurisdiction has a greater interest in regulating the underlying primary conduct.45  
“Comity” is not a rule of law nor a command from a higher authority; rather, it is a policy decision 
among sovereigns to “recogni[ze] legislative, executive, and judicial acts” of other sovereigns.46  As 
the following section explains, however, the Supreme Court has replaced this nuanced approach with 
a strict presumption against extraterritoriality.  
b. The Supreme Court’s Current Approach to Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
In the context of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust regulation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has paid homage to comity, holding that the Sherman Act should only provide a remedy for 
domestic harms and therefore that the Act does not reach claims based solely on foreign injury.47  The 
Court crafted a rule of statutory construction derived from section 403, which mandates interpreting 
“ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations.”48  Reasoning that courts should assume that Congress accounts for the “sovereign interests 
of other nations when they write American laws,” the comity-based rule of construction “helps 
                                                 
44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
45 See id. reporter’s note 2 to § 403 (discussing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 
382–83 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 
549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d 
Cir. 1945)). 
46 See Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).   
47 See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2004).  
48 Id. at 164.  
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potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony—a harmony particularly 
needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial world.”49   
Although the Court has retained an emphasis on statutory interpretation, it has moved away 
from a more nuanced, comity-based approach, instead adopting a one-sided “presumption against 
extraterritoriality,” which only considers whether Congress intended a statute to apply 
extraterritorially.50  This analysis is “one-sided” because it only considers the U.S. interest at stake; it 
does not consider whether another jurisdiction may have a greater interest in regulating the primary 
conduct at issue or whether a foreign jurisdiction may be a more suitable regulator.  The Court 
elucidated this rule in Morrison v. National Australia Bank LTD., where the Court held that the antifraud 
provision of the Securities Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially in favor of foreign plaintiffs 
bringing claims against foreign and domestic defendants for misstatements related to securities listed 
on foreign exchanges.51   
In so holding, the Court overruled the Second Circuit’s longstanding conduct-and-effects test, 
which resulted in extraterritorial application of the antifraud provision if either “the wrongful conduct 
had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens,” or “the wrongful conduct 
occurred in the United States.”52  Given the Second Circuit’s familiarity with cases arising out of Wall 
Street, and its resulting expertise in federal securities law, the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and 
D.C. Circuits had deferred to the Second Circuit and adopted the conduct-and-effects test.53  That test 
sounded in fundamental principles of prescriptive jurisdiction under international law, such as 
                                                 
49 Id. at 164–65.  
50 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank LTD, 561 U.S. 247, 255–58 (2010).  
51 Id. at 266–67.  
52 Id. at 257–58 (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003)) (emphasis added).  
53 Alex Reed, But I’m an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-Squared Securities Fraud Claims 
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, U. PA. J. BUS. L. 515, 516 (2012) (citing Danielle Kantor, 
Note, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-Cubed Case: Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in 
Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 839, 866–68 (2010)). 
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territorial, passive, personal, and protective jurisdiction, as well as the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relation Law’s additional reasonableness limitation.54  Indeed, the Morrison Court acknowledged that 
the analysis under the conduct-and-effects test assumed that “[a]s long as [Congress had] prescriptive 
jurisdiction to regulate” when passing on the issue whether to apply the antifraud provision 
extraterritorially, a court would have to answer whether such application “would be reasonable” such 
that “even . . . ‘predominantly foreign’ transactions became a matter of whether a court thought 
Congress ‘wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be 
devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries.’”55 
 The Court found the conduct-and-effects test to be problematic, however, arguing that it was 
unwieldy, unpredictable, and inconsistent in application.56  More fundamentally, the Court asserted 
that the test required courts to engage in a difficult mental exercise of attempting to determine what 
Congress would have said had it confronted extraterritoriality in the first instance, when a “more 
natural inquiry might be what jurisdiction Congress in fact thought about and conferred.”57  In light 
of these concerns, the Court eschewed the sophistication of the conduct-and-effects test, declaring 
“rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption [against extraterritoriality] in all cases, 
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”58 
c. The Current Approach and its Implications for the FCPA 
Although the Court has not ruled on the issue of the FCPA’s extraterritorial application, given 
Morrison’s presumption against extraterritoriality along with the plain language of the FCPA (i.e., its 
coverage of U.S. issuers, domestic concerns, and any conduct in furtherance of a foreign bribe 
occurring within U.S. territory), a litigant challenging the extraterritorial application of the FCPA 
                                                 
54 See supra text accompanying note 43.  
55 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257. 
56 Id. at 259–60.  
57 Id. at 260 (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (1987)).  
58 Id. at 261.  
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would likely face an uphill battle.  But the battle wouldn’t be unwinnable; indeed, countervailing 
interests could limit the extraterritorial application of the FCPA.   
The FCPA invokes two traditional bases of prescriptive jurisdiction under international law: 
nationality jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction.59  The FCPA’s nationality jurisdiction is embodied 
in sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2; as discussed above, its territorial jurisdiction is embodied in section 
78dd-3.60   Given that these jurisdictional hooks would bestow prescriptive jurisdiction to Congress 
to regulate foreign bribery, a facial application of Morrison to the FCPA could result in the statute 
applying extraterritorially because it communicates an “affirmative intention [that] Congress clearly 
expressed’ to give [the] statute extraterritorial effect.”61  But without considering whether such an 
application would also be reasonable, the analysis is incomplete.  Moreover, this further analytical step 
does not conflict with Morrison—there, a provision of the federal securities laws that was ambiguous as 
to its extraterritorial reach did not apply abroad in light of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  
The Court pronounced that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, 
it has none,”62 but the Court did not hold that when a statute indicates the possibility of extraterritorial 
application, courts may not second-guess such an application where it would be unreasonable.  Indeed, 
Morrison itself “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not 
foreign matters.”63  
Thus, although a court may end its analysis where a statute has no extraterritorial application 
on its face, if a statute such as the FCPA communicates a Congressional intention to apply 
extraterritorially, courts should determine whether a particular application abroad would nevertheless 
                                                 
59 See Developments in the Law--Extraterritoriality, VI. Extraterritorial Law and International Norm 
Internalization, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1280, 1286 (2011).  
60 See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text. 
61 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (2006)).  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
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be unreasonable.  In such case, courts should look to the section 403 factors.  In the context of the 
FCPA, six of the section 403 factors are particularly important: 1) the link of the activity to the territory 
of the regulating state; 2) the connections between the regulating state and the person principally 
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is 
designed to protect; 3) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; 4) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; 
5) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and 6) the likelihood 
of conflict with regulation by another state.  The following sections will analyze these factors with 
respect to the FCPA.   
i. The link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent 
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, 
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory 
Beyond the threshold question of whether a sovereign may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction 
to regulate foreign conduct, the reasonableness of exercising such jurisdiction should sound in more 
real-world, boots-on-the-ground terms.64  And, indeed, the degree to which a potential FCPA violation 
occurs within a foreign territory bears heavily on such practical considerations because of evidentiary 
and investigatory hurdles.65  These difficulties not only burden the government in investigating and 
prosecuting FCPA cases but may also systemically disadvantage the target of such a case.66   
Government prosecutors rely on three principal methods for obtaining evidence in FCPA 
cases: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs); Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs); and letters 
                                                 
64 Though this factor might also suggest a conduct-and-effects type analysis, the Morrison Court 
rejected this approach.  See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.  For doctrinal consistency, my 
view does not incorporate a similar analysis at this step.  
65 See generally, Mike Koehler, Navigating the Arcane World of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, Letters 
Rogatory and Evidence-Gathering from Abroad, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/navigating-the-arcane-world-of-mutual-le...istance-treaties-letters-
rogatory-and-evidence-gathering-from-abroad.  
66 See Hecker & Laporte, supra note 22.  
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rogatory.67  In theory, MLATs are intergovernmental agreements that require signatory countries to 
assist in government investigations;68 in practice, however, “[t]he United States has experienced the 
gamut of cooperation – from full-scale sharing of domestic investigative files on short notice to 
outright non-compliance.”69  MOUs, on the other hand, are not binding but instead provide terms 
upon which intergovernmental regulators will assist in investigations.70  Conversely, letters rogatory 
are requests from U.S. federal and state courts to foreign courts to obtain evidence; foreign courts 
may also issue these requests to U.S. courts and compliance on either end is based on a notion of 
comity.71   
Thus, the burdens on the prosecution in gathering foreign evidence in an FCPA case is 
manifest: the only binding method of doing so is through the use of MLATs, and even those are far 
from a guaranteed source of proof.  From the perspective of the target of such an investigation, the 
outlooks for conducting discovery abroad are even drearier: MLATs and MOUs are only available to 
government prosecutors, and letters rogatory only become available once the government has initiated 
a formal proceeding.72  In this instance, the benefits of U.S. regulators deferring to foreign jurisdictions 
to investigate and prosecute conduct that would otherwise fall within the ambit of the FCPA makes 
immensely practical sense, tipping the scales toward finding that the extraterritorial application of the 
FCPA in such a case would be unreasonable.            
ii. The connections between the regulating state and the person principally 
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those 
whom the regulation is designed to protect 
                                                 
67 See Koehler, supra note 65; Nicholas M. McLean, Note, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 
121 YALE L.J. 1970, 1987–88 (2012).  
68 McLean, supra note 67, at 1987.  
69 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES: QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3 
OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY §10.2 (2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf. 
70 See McLean, supra note 67, at 1988 & n.60.  
71 See “Letters Rogatory” Defined, 22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (2006).  
72 See Koehler, supra note 65. 
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 Considering the connections between the United States and an FCPA defendant, as well as 
between the United States and whom the FCPA is designed to protect, courts should bear in mind 
that the FCPA carries criminal penalties, including terms of imprisonment for individuals and hefty 
fines for both corporate defendants and individuals.73  In general, the jurisdiction in which certain 
conduct occurs should determine whether conduct is sufficiently odious to be criminalized.74  From a 
theoretical perspective, applying antibribery laws extraterritorially may impinge on another sovereign’s 
ability to regulate its citizens and conflict with its notions of appropriate relations between business 
and government;75 and from a practical standpoint, U.S. intervention in foreign bribery may have a 
deleterious impact on a foreign jurisdiction’s abilities and incentives to regulate bribery within its 
boundaries.  
An example that crystallizes these concerns is the United States’ collection of fines related to 
FCPA violations, all of which accrue to the U.S. Treasury.76  Thus, the United States may apply the 
FCPA to foreign conduct that only tangentially touches the states, and in doing so the government 
may not only stamp a foreign corporation or individual as a convicted criminal but also unilaterally 
convert foreign funds to U.S. dollars for government use.  This is so even if a foreign jurisdiction 
prohibits the same bribery that the FCPA covers and if that jurisdiction (rather than the states) would 
                                                 
73 “For each violation of the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA provides that corporations and other 
business entities are subject to a fine of up to $2 million.  Individuals, including officers, directors, 
stockholders, and agents of companies, are subject to a fine of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for 
up to five years.  For each violation of the accounting provisions, the FCPA provides that 
corporations and other business entities are subject to a fine of up to $25 million.  Individuals are 
subject to a fine of up to $5 million and imprisonment for up to 20 years.” DOJ & SEC GUIDE, 
supra note 4, at 68 (footnote call numbers omitted).  
74 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1 & n.1 (2010) (quoting Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 
347, 356 (1909)).  
75 See Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1114–16 (1982). 
76 FCPA Fines: Where Does All the Money Go?, TRACE BLOG, http://www.traceinternational.org/fcpa-
fines-where-does-all-the-money-go/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).  
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collect fines from a bribery prosecution, not to mention that once that jurisdiction collected such fines 
it might distribute the monies collected in a manner much differently than the U.S. government 
would.77 
Underscoring this is the sheer amount of money that the U.S. government has collected from 
foreign firms as a result of FCPA violations, an amount that is disproportionate to fines collected 
from domestic firms.  Indeed, out of the top ten FCPA settlements through 2014, eight were from 
foreign firms, and although thirty percent of FCPA cases are against foreign firms, those cases made 
up sixty-seven percent of all FCPA fines.78  As an example of just how much an FCPA prosecution 
can cost a foreign firm, Seimens AG, a German corporation, settled FCPA charges with the DOJ for 
$800 million.79  The allegations were that Siemens violated the FCPA’s accounting and antibribery 
provisions, and although the DOJ obtained jurisdiction over Siemens because the company was an 
issuer that was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the alleged bribery did not carry a strong 
nexus to the United States.80  Moreover, foreign prosecutors from Italy and Germany also investigated 
Siemens,81 and on top of the FCPA fines, Siemens paid €395 million to German authorities for related 
charges.82  
FCPA fines from foreign defendants resulting from foreign conduct are amounts that could 
otherwise strengthen the capabilities of foreign prosecutors to regulate the same conduct.  Moreover, 
if U.S. prosecutors were to defer to foreign regulators in such cases, it could allow those regulators to 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., DAVID LAWLER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 
233–34 (2012) (discussing the differences in fine collection between U.S. and U.K. antibribery 
regimes).  
78 Leibold, supra note 26, at 234–36.  
79 Id. at 235.  
80 Id. at 242.  
81 Information at 13, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C. 2008) (08-CR-367-RJL), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/05/02/12-12-
08siemensakt-info.pdf.  
82 Leibold, supra note 26, at 243.  
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take into account the appropriate degree of government interference in light of the needs and nuances 
of the foreign jurisdiction’s social, political, and economic condition.  The global reach of the FCPA, 
however, may have hampered any such development.  
iii. The existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by 
the regulation  
 In matters of contract and business, justified expectations that a particular jurisdiction governs 
a certain transaction have traditionally provided a basis for applying that jurisdiction’s law.83  The 
rationale was that “parties enter into contracts with forethought and are likely to consult a lawyer 
before doing so.”84  And although this rationale may seem deceivingly simple, it remains true today, 
especially in the complex, global marketplace.  For instance, cross-jurisdictional transactions, such as 
complex mergers and acquisitions, may require mountains of due diligence by teams of lawyers.  
Applying the FCPA abroad may (and, indeed, has) complicated such transactions to the extent that 
the associated FCPA risks become cost prohibitive.  
 The central danger that the FCPA poses to cross-jurisdictional M&As is that it allows an 
acquiring company to be held liable for the target’s prior FCPA violations through successor liability.85  
Given the broad reach of territorial jurisdiction under the FCPA and that the FCPA allows liability 
through the activity of a firm’s agent, the operators of targets who may never have expected that they 
would be subject to liability under the FCPA may find themselves unable to do business with western 
companies that are more FCPA savvy or, alternatively, an acquiring company that is unaware that the 
FCPA covers a target (or that the target has violated the FCPA) may find itself in hot water with U.S. 
                                                 
83 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. b (1971).  
84 Id.  
85 See DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 28–30; see also M&A Due Diligence and Successor Liability, 
ALLEN & OVERY, http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/FCPA/Pages/M-and-A-due-
diligence-and-successor-liability.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2015) (“The overarching corruption risk in 
the M&A context is, of course, successor liability: The risk of buying a company that is already 
covered by the FCPA and that has already violated it, leading potentially to liability for the purchaser 
based on pre-acquisition acts over which it had no control.”).  
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regulators.86  Moreover, successor liability may leave a foreign acquirer of another foreign company 
doubly flummoxed because it may not only be unforeseeable that the target had engaged in bribery 
but also that the FCPA would apply to either foreign corporation.    
 Given the costs of FCPA due diligence, the accumulation of these risks may detrimentally 
affect business before the U.S. government even begins an FCPA investigation.  And aside from the 
costs associated with due diligence itself, the resulting information may result in companies 
abandoning deals in light of an insurmountable likelihood of successor liability,87 even if the acquiring 
company would have installed a noncorrupt corporate culture.  Moreover, FCPA concerns will 
commonly inhere to transactions involving firms with cross-border business dealings, and this itself 
will make adequate due diligence all the more difficult because the target may have complex 
organizational structures with multifaceted corporate cultures and the necessary documentation may 
be difficult to access.88  
 In light of these difficulties and the traditional importance that justified expectations have 
played in matters of choice of law, U.S. courts should be hesitant to apply the FCPA extraterritorially 
if doing so would cause undue surprise to the defendant in an FCPA case.  Although this factor may 
                                                 
86 Cf. DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 31 (discussing a hypothetical situation where an acquiring 
firm could not be held liable for a target’s “potentially improper payments” where the target was not 
previously subject to the FCPA because it “was neither an issuer nor a domestic concern and was 
not subject to U.S. territorial jurisdiction”).   
87 See Adam Prestidge, Note, Avoiding FCPA Surprises: Safe Harbor From Successor Liability in Cross-
Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 305, 313–15 (2013).  
88 See KPMG, M&A DUE DILIGENCE AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2009), 
https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Foreign-
Corrupt-Practices-Act-200911.pdf (“Acquisition targets with complex organisational structures, 
multiple reporting lines and overseas business units exercising a degree of autonomy may also imply 
that an investor has to deal with multiple cultures and an increased likelihood of the occurrence of 
corruption and bribery, and financial frauds.”); Prestidge, supra note 87, at 314–15 (“Proper diligence 
can be even more expensive and time-consuming in foreign countries where important business 
information is not as easily accessible because information may only be available from unwilling 
parties, from closed government records, or from outdated public records.” (footnote call number 
omitted)).  
 23 
not be present in every case, the uncertainty that potential successor liability may have in foreign 
markets represents an external effect of the FCPA’s broad jurisdictional scope.  Thus, paying heed to 
this factor in individual cases could bring about a more wide ranging positive impact.  
iv. The importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or 
economic system 
No doubt regulating bribery is important; indeed, the public in both developed and emerging 
countries views corruption as a significant hindrance to progress.89  Regulators have recognized this: 
across the globe, nations have followed the United States’ lead in passing the FCPA and have entered 
into conventions requiring them to enact antibribery laws, leading to the conclusion that “[i]t is only 
a matter of time before most of the world will have adopted domestic legislation similar in nature to 
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.”90  With this in mind, the importance of enforcing the FCPA 
extraterritorially becomes questionable, and although such extraterritoriality may have been defensible 
when the United States passed the FCPA and became a world leader in regulating corporate bribery, 
the newly minted antibribery regulations in foreign jurisdictions give reason to dial back the United 
States’ vigorous FCPA enforcement abroad.   
As discussed above, the OECD Convention was a crucial step toward global regulation—at 
the domestic level—of corruption under frameworks similar to the FCPA.91  Other international 
conventions with similar objectives include the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the 
Council of European Criminal and Civil Law Conventions, the Council of European Criminal Law 
Convention, the Council of Civil Law Convention, and the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption.92  Various countries have signed on to these conventions, and as of 2015, forty-one 
                                                 
89 See Gledhill, supra note 2, at  156 (quoting Coatsworth, J. et al, Strategies for Addressing 
Corruption in the Americas (1999)).  
90 DEMING, supra note 16, at 306.  
91 See supra notes 14–18.  
92 See generally DEMING, supra note 16, at 309–43.  
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countries have signed on to the OECD Convention;93 but while some countries have expanded their 
enforcement activity, others have lagged behind. Since 2005, Transparency International, a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan organization with the objective of “combat[ing] corruption in government and 
international business and development,”94 has assembled an annual report of the enforcement levels 
that OECD signatory countries have maintained.  The report categorizes countries’ enforcement 
activity as ranging from “Active Enforcement” to “Little or No Enforcement,” depending on the time 
period of enforcement (the 2015 report includes enforcement actions from 2011 to 2014), a country’s 
share of world exports, and a point system that weighs different enforcement activities relative to the 
magnitude of the cases that a country prosecutes. 95   The report provides that four countries 
comprising 22.8 percent of world exports—the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Switzerland—maintain “Active Enforcement” levels.96  Conversely, twenty countries comprising 20.5 
percent of world exports engage in little or no enforcement.97 
Because the “reasonableness” analysis that I propose allows case-by-case inquiry into whether 
the United States should pursue largely foreign bribery under the FCPA, courts could take into account 
the extent of antibribery enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction to determine how important U.S. 
intervention may or may not be.  This factor could therefore tip the scales toward pursuing FCPA 
                                                 
93 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION–PROGRESS REPORT 2015: ASSESSING 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING FOREIGN BRIBERY (2015), 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_corruption_progress_report_2015
_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd.  
94 Press Release, Transparency Int’l, TI-USA and CIPE Release Country Reports on Implementing 
APEC Public Procurement Transparency Standards in Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines (July 16, 2011), 
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20110716_APEC_standards.  .  
95 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 93, at 15–17.  
96 Id. at 7.  “A country that is an Active enforcer initiates many investigation [sic] into foreign bribery 
offences, these investigations reach the courts, the authorities press charges and courts convict 
individuals and/or companies both in ordinary cases and in major cases in which bribers are 
convicted and receive substantial sanctions.”  Id. at 11.  
97 Id. at 7.  “Where there is ‘Little or No Enforcement’ there is no deterrence.”  Id. at 15.  
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prosecution in countries that have only nominally signed on to the OECD Convention while deferring 
to other jurisdictions engaged in active antibribery enforcement, with an eye toward settling on a 
sufficient degree of deterrence.  Although the statistics discussed above are limited to OECD 
Convention signatory countries, a similar analysis would be available in the case of other countries by 
measuring the levels of domestic antibribery enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction as a proxy for the 
importance of U.S. antibribery enforcement in that jurisdiction.   
v. The extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity  
Although “interest analysis” derives from U.S. conflict-of-laws doctrine, section 403’s 
consideration of the competing regulatory interests of various jurisdictions reflects international law’s 
adoption of such an approach. 98   The traditional American form of interest analysis, however, 
introduced in Professor Brainerd Currie’s Married Women’s Contracts,99 is distinguishable from the form 
of “interest analysis” put forth in section 403.  Specifically, Currie’s interest analysis only asked whether 
a jurisdiction has an interest in applying its law to a set of facts in light of the purpose of the law and 
the nexus that a given set of facts has to that purpose.100  Currie’s approach therefore did not propose 
balancing competing interests but asked only if a given jurisdiction had an interest in regulating a set of 
facts, in which case that law should apply; if multiple jurisdictions had actual interests in applying their 
law, this presented a true conflict, in which case “[t]he sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any 
court to do,” Professor Currie espoused, “is to apply its own law.”101  
                                                 
98 See ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE, 
PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE 
LAW 259 (2009).  
99 See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 
227 (1958). 
100 See id. at 231–33.  
101 Id. at 261.  
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Conversely, section 403(2)(g) by its very terms invites determining whether other jurisdictions 
may have an interest in regulating a particular set of facts.  Thus, section 403 has embraced interest 
balancing where two jurisdictions may have competing interests in regulating the same set of facts, 
which for our purposes would involve corrupt payments to public officials.  In such a case, whether 
the payment is prohibited and, if so, what penalty may attach to that payment, may very well depend 
on which jurisdiction’s law applies.  Moreover, balancing interests may allow a court to account for 
cultural nuances that would render another jurisdiction’s law more appropriate to handle a certain set 
of facts.  Although the next section will consider how to approach cases where two competing 
jurisdictions have conflicting law, this section proposes that to determine whether applying the FCPA 
extraterritorially would be reasonable, courts should follow section 403’s approach and conduct a 
searching analysis of whether another jurisdiction may have an interest in regulating bribery rather 
than the United States.  
From a theoretical standpoint, U.S. courts have grappled with whether the FCPA prohibits 
certain payments because of definitional difficulties that another jurisdiction may otherwise have an 
interest in and may be more adept at defining.  For instance, the FCPA prohibits payments to “foreign 
officials” including government “instrumentalities,”102 but whether this encompasses employees of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs)103 is unclear from the face of the statute.  Indeed, given the complex 
policy decisions and practical implications that a system of government favoring state ownership over 
corporations presents,104 a foreign government would likely have an interest in determining whether 
                                                 
102 15 U.S.C. § 78-dd–1 (f)(1)(A) (2012).  
103 Generally, state-owned enterprises are “any corporate entity recognized by national law as an 
enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership.”   ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES 14 (2015). 
104 See id. at 17 (discussing the rationales for state ownership) .  
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SOE employees should be considered government officials such that certain payments to them 
constitute illicit bribery.   
Nevertheless, U.S. courts have agreed with the government’s position that SOEs are 
government instrumentalities for FCPA purposes.105  But a recent case out of the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals created a more complicated standard for determining whether any given commercial 
enterprise is a government instrumentality subject to the FCPA.  In United States v. Esquenazi, the court 
noted that it was the first court of appeals to address the issue and held that “an entity must be under 
the control or dominion of the government to qualify as an ‘instrumentality’ within the FCPA’s 
meaning,” and in addition, “an instrumentality must be doing the business of the government.”106  As 
to the first requirement, government “control” over the entity turns on the following factors:  
the foreign government’s formal designation of that entity; whether the government 
has a majority interest in the entity; the government’s ability to hire and fire the entity’s 
principals; the extent to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly into the 
governmental fisc, and . . . the extent to which the government funds the entity if it 
fails to break even; and the length of time these indicia have existed.107   
 
The court interpreted the second element, “doing the business of the government,” to turn on whether 
“the entity performs a function the government treats as its own.”108  In turn, this depends on yet an 
additional set of factors:  
whether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists to carry out; whether the 
government subsidizes the costs associated with the entity providing services; whether 
the entity provides services to the public at large in the foreign country; and whether 
the public and the government of that foreign country generally perceive the entity to 
be performing a governmental function.109 
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Given this complex analysis, whether an SOE counts as a “government instrumentality” 
remains vague, but what is as clear as day is that courts, regulators, and businesses will continue to 
struggle with determining (before facing FCPA charges) whether the FCPA applies to any given 
payment in the context of SOEs or other commercial enterprises with a link to government.110  And 
by applying the FCPA abroad to the extent that the U.S. government has, it has usurped, overridden, 
and undermined other jurisdictions’ ability to define what payments the law should proscribe.   
Furthermore, U.S. prosecution of bribery cases abroad may have created a free rider problem 
whereby foreign jurisdictions have become rationally apathetic to prosecuting those same cases.  This 
therefore may have diluted any interest foreign jurisdictions may have had in creating robust 
antibribery enforcement schemes.  Indeed, just as the Kyoto Protocol, a treaty calling for multinational 
environmental legislation, has suffered from “free rider problems [that] make it unlikely that adequate 
participation and compliance will be achieved,” 111  it is not implausible that U.S. antibribery 
enforcement abroad has removed an incentive from foreign OECD Convention signatories to self-
regulate.   
Thus, we’ve seen not only that foreign jurisdictions may be better suited to regulate bribery 
that occurs within its bounds but also that expansive foreign antibribery enforcement at the hands of 
U.S. prosecutors may result in regulatory free riding by other nations.  The better approach in such a 
case is to determine whether another state has an interest in applying its own antibribery provisions.  
As we will see in the next section, this analysis leans even further toward deferring to another 
jurisdiction’s antibribery regulations when they conflict with the FCPA.  
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vi. The likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.  
Whereas the previous section considered how courts should determine whether a jurisdiction 
aside from the United States has an interest in regulating bribery that occurs within its bounds, this 
section considers how courts should decide what to do if both the United States and a foreign 
jurisdiction have an interest in regulating foreign bribery, and if each jurisdictions’ regulations conflict.  
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law deals directly with this issue—section 403(3) provides 
that: 
When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a 
person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an 
obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state’s interest in exercising jurisdiction, 
in light of all the relevant factors, [including those set out in] Subsection (2); a state should 
defer to the other state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.112     
Thus, as opposed to Currie’s default position requiring U.S. courts to apply the FCPA to largely 
foreign conduct even if the FCPA conflicted with the foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory regime, 113 
section 403(3) provides a more nuanced approach, suggesting that U.S. courts should defer to another 
jurisdiction with a conflicting antibribery regime.  Nevertheless, because this is only one of many 
factors that courts should consider when deciding whether to allow an extraterritorial FCPA 
prosecution, courts may lessen the weight that they give to this factor where a foreign jurisdiction 
enacts a conflicting antibribery law but underenforces it.  Given the complex problems that regulating 
foreign bribery creates, the best approach to interest balancing in this context would consider both (a) 
the degree of conflict that a foreign law presents on its face, and (b) the level of enforcement as a proxy 
for the degree of actual conflict with the FCPA.   
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Three foreign jurisdictions have recently enacted regimes that stand in fundamental conflict 
with the FCPA: Brazil, China, and the United Kingdom.  The remainder of this section will 
comparatively analyze these regulations against the FCPA.  
1.  Brazil’s Clean Companies Act 
Brazil’s economy has faltered in recent years, and corruption has played a role in this 
downturn.114  For instance, Brazil’s largest investor—the state-owned oil company, Petrobras—has 
recently become embroiled in corruption charges, spurring an FCPA investigation by the SEC that 
could result in fines of over $1.6 billion, which if paid would be the largest FCPA settlement to date.115  
Analysts estimate that the lessened spending as a result of the Petrobras investigation may reduce 
Brazil’s GDP by a full percentage point.116  In addition, the Federation of Industries of the State of 
São Paulo reports, “Brazil loses 1.38% to 2.3% of its GDP in kickbacks and bribes.”117 
Despite these calls for government intervention, Brazil’s regulation of bribery involving 
foreign officials has been remarkably low.  Specifically, although fourteen allegations of bribery of 
foreign public officials have come to light, since agreeing to the OECD Convention, Brazil has only 
prosecuted one case as of October 2014.118  Indeed, Transparency International’s ranking Brazil as a 
country engaged in “Little or no enforcement” since becoming a member to the OECD convention 
reflects this underenforcement.119  But this is not to say that Brazil does not have laws on the books 
enabling bribery prosecutions: in 2013, President Dilma Roussef passed an anticorruption law known 
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as the “Clean Company Act,”120 which imposes strict liability on legal entities engaged in foreign and 
domestic bribery of public officials.121   
The substantive differences between the Clean Company Act and the FCPA are numerous 
but two particular differences present fundamental conflicts between the laws.  First, whereas the 
FCPA requires proof of “corrupt intent,” the Clean Company Act is a strict liability offense that 
imposes liability regardless of a defendant’s motives.122  In practice, this makes the Clean Company 
Act broader than the FCPA insofar as conduct that may create liability; moreover, this suggests that 
Brazil’s legislative intent in passing the Clean Company Act was to reach more activity, and thus spur 
more rigorous enforcement than the United States would impose under the FCPA.  A second area of 
conflict between the Clean Company Act and the FCPA further supports the notion that the Clean 
Company Act demonstrates a legislative intent to apply more broadly and be enforced more rigorously 
than the FCPA: the Clean Company Act applies to bribery of both foreign and domestic public 
officials.123  Brazil’s affirmative decision to prohibit corrupt payments to its own public officials 
indicates that the country wishes to clean up the manner and culture in which corporations interact 
with the country as a sovereign; given the corruption that has plagued Brazil, vigorous domestic 
antibribery enforcement without the need of foreign intervention could reaffirm the Brazilian public’s 
confidence in its domestic government.   
Thus, Brazil’s Clean Company Act exemplifies a sovereign decision to regulate corruption 
independently—a decision that U.S. intervention could compromise.  Indeed, if Brazil were able to 
recover fines that the U.S. commonly seeks in its FCPA prosecutions, the country would be better 
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able to pursue bribery investigations and prosecutions.  But FCPA enforcement could decrease Brazil’s 
incentive to do so, creating a crutch for Brazilian regulators. 124  Thus, in FCPA cases involving 
Brazilian corporations or officials, U.S. courts should consider the interest that Brazil may have in 
prosecuting cases independently and defer to Brazil when doing so would further that interest.  
2.  China’s Anticorruption Regulations 
 China’s economic, political, and cultural characteristics present prickly issues for regulating 
corruption and bribery.  Given its communist foundations, many corporations in China are state 
owned, making such companies’ officials potential recipients of bribes; additionally, Chinese business 
culture is traditionally rooted in developing relationships via gift giving, a practice known as guanxi.125  
The confluence of these factors has resulted in China’s public condemnation of corruption but only 
to a degree that tolerates low-level payments that might otherwise be considered corrupt.126  And 
although commentators have recognized increased supply-side anticorruption enforcement by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), most notably the commercial bribery conviction of a Chinese 
subsidiary of pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline,127 others have questioned whether demand-
side anticorruption enforcement, i.e., prosecutions of corrupt government officials, has been a product 
of political strategy rather than public interest.128 
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 Against this complex backdrop, the PRC regulates corruption with a web of regulations, the 
two most important of which are the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC (AUCL) and certain 
sections of the PRC Criminal Law.129  In an interesting divergence from many other anticorruption 
regulations, China bifurcates its regulations to cover two different sorts of corruption: whereas Article 
8 of the AUCL and Article 163 of the PRC Criminal Law cover “commercial bribery” between private 
persons, PRC Criminal Law Articles 389–95 cover “official corruption, defined as payments to state 
officials.”130  But because many “private persons” will also be employees of state-owned entities, the 
FCPA may also apply to conduct under both categories of corruption.131   
 Given the potential overlap between the FCPA and Chinese anticorruption regulations, 
conflicts between the laws are readily apparent.  First, as opposed to solely government enforcement 
under the FCPA, the AUCL provides a private right of action for entities that allege harm resulting 
from commercial bribery.132  Assuming that a private AUCL plaintiff would be able to accurately 
monetize the harm resulting from commercial bribery, a parallel FCPA and private AUCL prosecution 
could result in double recovery against the offending entity; deferring to a solely Chinese resolution 
of the case could therefore be a more efficient enforcement mechanism than a dual prosecution 
because it could provide an accurate remedy for a harmed Chinese entity while saving U.S. 
prosecutorial resources.  Second, whereas an FCPA charge may result in a maximum term of 
imprisonment of up to twenty years, a violation in the form of bribery under the PRC Criminal Law 
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may result in a lifetime sentence for the bribe payor.133  Thus, the potential remedial effects that 
Chinese corruption prosecutions may provide, if fully imposed, could suffice to deter future violations.  
Thus, even  if a U.S. court may have prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate such conduct under the FCPA, 
it may find that in light of the magnitude of the actions that Chinese prosecutors and plaintiffs bring, 
the application of the FCPA would be unreasonable.  
 3.  The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 
 Passed in 2010, the U.K. Bribery Act bears a close resemblance to the FCPA, applying 
extraterritorially and prohibiting bribery to foreign officials, but it presents various important 
differences.134  The United Kingdom’s level of enforcement is also comparable to that of the United 
States; indeed, Transparency International places the United Kingdom among the four OECD 
signatory countries with “active enforcement” levels.135  At the outset, this therefore increases the 
degree of actual conflict between the FCPA and the Bribery Act.  For companies doing business in 
both the United States and the United Kingdom, the threat of liability under both the Bribery Act and 
the FCPA presents grave risks and incentives to implement comprehensive compliance programs.  
But given a number of facial conflicts between the laws, cases that are amenable to both FCPA and 
Bribery Act prosecutions may present reason for the United States to dial back a vigorous application 
of the FCPA where the Bribery Act also applies.  
The Bribery Act creates three separate offenses for 1) bribing another person (including 
offenses for both the payor and payee), 2) bribing a foreign official, and 3) failing to prevent bribery.136  
The third offense presents an important dissimilarity from the FCPA: a commercial organization may 
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be liable under the Bribery Act “if a person associated with it bribes another person intending to 
obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for that organization”; however, 
an affirmative defense for the organization is available if it can “show that despite a particular case of 
bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons associated with it from 
bribing.”137  A further difference between this offense and the FCPA is that it imposes strict liability 
for failure to prevent bribery, whereas the FCPA requires corrupt intent.138  And two other conflicts 
are present where the FCPA provides defenses that the Bribery Act does not include: 1) the FCPA 
creates an exception for facilitating payments intended to “expedite or secure the performance of a 
‘routine governmental action,’”; and 2) the FCPA provides an affirmative defense for promotional 
expenses that are “reasonable and bona fide business expenses that are directly related to the 
promotion, demonstration or explanation of products or services.”139 
Given these differences in what conduct may or may not create liability, the extraterritorial 
application of either the FCPA or the Bribery Act, albeit a permissible exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction, may nonetheless be unreasonable.  For example, in cases involving firms operating in 
both the United States and United Kingdom, where an initial investigation by U.S. regulators turns up 
evidence that the target of an investigation either made a permissible facilitating payment or 
promotional expenditure, further investigatory resources need not be expended if U.K. regulators are 
also pursuing the same activity because that activity would not likely escape the grasp of the Bribery 
Act.  And more generally, because the Bribery Act applies more broadly than the FCPA by allowing 
prosecutions of both bribers and bribees, a Bribery Act prosecution may be more efficient than 
bringing parallel FCPA charges against only the briber.  
Conclusion.  
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 Given the current state of FCPA enforcement, decreased prosecutorial vigilance is unlikely.  
But the answer to the complex issues that the extraterritorial application of the FCPA presents is not 
to give in to the U.S. government’s aggressive application of the FCPA but rather to challenge this 
approach in court.  Successful challenges would allow other jurisdictions to develop regulatory regimes 
that could take into account the nuances of their respective cultures, polities, economies, and societies, 
while continuing to provide cross-jurisdictional cooperation and assistance where necessary.  In the 
short term, this may call for more attention to bribery and corruption from jurisdictions that have 
historically relied on the efforts of U.S. prosecutors; in the long term, however, governmental 
investment in the regulation of corruption will become a self-sustaining task and will allow foreign 
countries to define corruption and its consequences in light of their particular social, economic, and 
political needs.      
Although a global approach to the FCPA may have been appropriate at one point in time, 
given the development of competing legislation abroad, the time has come to sunset the FCPA’s 
vigorous enforcement platform.  From the perspective of the United States, this will allow more focus 
on domestic issues by freeing up prosecutorial resources that were otherwise invested in prosecuting 
cases with only tangential links to or effects on the United States.  Moreover, easing off of such cases 
and deferring to other jurisdictions would fulfill the original purpose of the FCPA—fostering trust 
and beneficial relations between the United States and foreign countries.    
 
   
